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Bank, 221 Pa. 599, 70 Atl. 876 (1908). A different rule prevails where the wrong-
ful agent is a government official having authority under the treasury rules to
draw instruments payable to the order of real persons only because if he draws
it payable to a fictitious person and indorses the payee's name the depository
bank will be charged with notice that the agent's authority is limited. Nat. Bank
of Commerce v. United State, 224 Fed. 679 (C.C.A. 9th, 1915). Banks have also
been allowed to recover in cases where the payee has himself been negligent.
Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N.Y. 220, 63 N.E. 969 (1902); California
Vegetable U. Co. v. Crocker Nat. Bank, 37 Cal. App. 743, 174 Pac. 920 (1918).
Where monthly statements were furnished by the bank, together with the
original checks, and no errors were reported therein for three years, the evi-
dence is held sufficient to show neglignce on the part of the bank and to preclude
a recovery by the drawee. C. E. Erickson Co'tpany v. Iowa Nat. Bank, 211 Iowa
495, 230 N.W. 342 (1930); General Cigar Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 290 Fed. 143
(C.C.A. 9th, 1923). The rule is not the same if the bank was itself negligent.
Wussow v. Badger State Bank, 204 Wis. 467, 234 N.W. 720 (1930). In the cases
holding the bank exempt from liability because of the plaintiff's negligence, it
affirmatively appears that the bank was not negligent or the question of its
negligence was not raised. In the instant case although the issue of negligence
on the part of the drawer was raised, the court brushed it aside because there
was no evidence that the board had any knowledge that the payees named were
fictitious and therefore they could not have been put upon notice.
RICHARD M. RICE.
BANKRUPTCY-PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 74-PROPETY OF DEBTOR IN CUS-
TODY OF AN OFFICER OF THE CoURT.-In 1932 the debtor executed a bond and
mortgage for $2700. After default judgment by confession was entered on the
bond as prescribed by the local statutes. Thereafter a writ of execution was
issued. The property was seized and advertised for sale. Prior to the sale the
debtor filed a petition for an extension under Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act.
The mortgagee-creditor claimed under the seizure and contended that the court
had no power to interfere with the seizure on behalf of the debtor because the
property was not in the constructive possession of the debtor and bacause a
final decree had been entered in the creditor's action. The court, in dismissing
a petition for review of a report of the special master recommending that an
order restraining the mortgagee from selling be made permanent, held that a
state court's custody of the res cannot affect the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction
and that since no sale had been confirmed no final decree had been entered
within the meaning of Section 74. The court directed that the order to show
cause why an injunction against the mortgagee should not issue be made abso-
lute. In re Krull, 21 F. Supp. 377 (M.D. Pa. 1937).
Under the older provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, where the debtor is
adjudged a bankrupt and his estate is to be liquidated, the bankruptcy court
cannot interfere with foreclosure process begun by secured creditors outside the
bankruptcy court and before the filing of any petition in bankruptcy by or
against the debtor. Straton v. New, 283 U.S. 318, 51 Sup. Ct. 465, 75 L.ed. 1060
(1930). After a petition is filed by or against a debtor to have him adjudged a
bankrupt then the bankruptcy court only has jurisdiction and no foreclosure
suits may be started unless with the consent of the bankruptcy court. Isaacs v.
Hobbs T. & T. Co., 282 U.S. 738, 51 Sup. Ct. 270, 75 L.ed. 645 (1930). Section
74 was drawn apparently to afford jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court over the
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debtor's property already affected by foreclosures as long as the property was still
in the "constructive" possession of the debtor. The section provided originally
that, "The filing of a debtor's petition or answer seeking relief under this section
shall subject the debtor and his property, wherever located, to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the court in which the order approving the petition or answer
... is filed." Section 74(m), 47 STAT. 1470 (1933). The courts held immediately
that mortgaged property in the possession of foreclosure receivers was no longer
within the constructive possession of the debtor unless the actions had been
started within four months of the filing of the debtor's petition. In re Land-
quist, 70 F. (2d) 929 (C.C.A. 7th, 1934); Molina v. Murphy, 71 F. (2d) 605
(C.C.A. 1st, 1934). Section 74 ,n) was amended to include specifically as prop-
erty of the debtor within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court any property
in the possession of a trustee under a trust deed or a mortgage, or a receiver,
custodian or other officer of any court in a pending cause, "irrespective of the
date of the appointment of such receiver or other officer, or the date of the
institution of such proceedings: Provided, that it shall not affect any proceeding
in any court in which a final decree has been entered." 48 STAT. 923 (1934), 11
U.S.C.A. § 202 (in) (1937). See In re Monsen, 74 F. (2d) 411 (C.C.A. 7th, 1935).
In the instant case the court pointed out that seizure on process after judgment
by confession put the mortgagee into a position similar to that where a receiver
is appointed in ordinary foreclosures. The court held that judgment by confes-
sion was not a final decree. A final decree within the meaning of Section 74(m)
under the law of the particular local jurisdiction is a decree confirming a sale.
In Wisconsin the equities of the mortgagor-debtor are not cut off in foreclosure
proceedings until the sale has been confirmed. Gerhardt v. Ellis, 134 Wis. 191, 114
N.W. 495 (1908). If the sale is by advertisement, as was proposed in the instant
case according to the local statutes, and if there is to be no decree of confirma-
tion ever entered, the property is probably within the "constructive" possession
of the debtor until the debtor's statutory period of redemption has expired.
BANKS AND BANKING-SUBROGATION-RIGHT OF FDIC To SHARE IN ASSETS
OF INSURED INSOLVENT BANK.-The bank was insolvent. Liquidation was begun
under the direction of the Commissioner of Banking. Each of the bank's deposi-
tors was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to the extent
of $5,000. There were some depositors whose deposits exceeded that amount.
In accordance with the Act of Congress creating the FDIC [48 STAT. 168 (1934),
12 U.S.C.A. § 264 (1) (7) (1937)] upon payment by the FDIC each depositor
executed an assignment to the corporation that it might be subrograted to all the
claimant's rights against the closed bank. The claim of the FDIC based upon
the assignments was recognized by the Commissioner. The present proceeding
before the Court of Chancery was upon a petition by the Commissioner to deter-
mine the method of distribution to be used in making the first cash dividend.
Three methods of distribution were possible: (1) The FDIC might be paid in
full before the "excess" depositors could be paid upon their "excess" deposits;
(2) the "excess" depositors and the FDIC might share pro rata on the respec-
tive amounts of their claims for the amount up to and the amount in excess of
$5,000; (3) the "excess" depositors might receive full payment for the amount
of the excess prior to any payment being made to the FDIC. The provision
of the Act providing for sugrogation includes the right to receive the same
dividends from the proceeds of the assets of the closed bank as would be pay-
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